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Kant's transcendental idealism hinges on a distinction between appearances and things in 
themselves. The debate about how to understand this distinction has largely ignored the way 
that Kant applies this distinction to the self. I argue that this is a mistake, and that Kant's 
acceptance of a single, unified self in both his theoretical and practical philosophy causes 
serious problems for the 'two-world' interpretation of his idealism. 
 
 
 The most important distinction in Kant’s metaphysics is that between appearances and 
things-in-themselves (between phenomena and noumena),
1
 as shown by the fact that it is this 
distinction which Kant primarily appeals to in defining 'transcendental idealism.'
2
 Broadly 
speaking, Kant’s readers have interpreted the distinction in two ways. One group of 
interpreters claims that appearances and things-in-themselves are, in some important sense, 
the same things. Another group of interpreters claims that appearances and things-in-
themselves are not, in any important sense, the same things. The former sort of interpretations 
are typically called ‘one-world’ or 'two-aspect' interpretations, the latter, ‘two-world’ or 'two 
object' interpretations.  
 This terminology misleadingly suggests that all interpretations can be neatly identified 
as one or the other.
3
 There are different senses one might give to the notion of ‘same things,’ 
                                                     
1
 Also: empirical/sensible vs. intellectual. Though these are not exactly the same distinctions (cf. KrV B307 on 
the two senses of 'noumenon'), this will not matter for my argument (on these distinctions, see Willaschek, 
Marcus: “Die Mehrdeutigkeit der Unterscheidung zwischen Dingen an sich und Erscheinungen bei Kant. Zur 
Debatte um Zwei-Aspekte- und Zwei-Welten-Interpretationen des transzendentalen Idealismus”. In Akten des 
IX. Internationalen Kant-Kongresses. Berlin 2001, 679–690).  
2
 E.g. KrV A28/B44, A36/B52, A491/B519, Prol, 4:293, 4:337, 4:374.  
3
 Anja Jauernig (Jauernig, Anja: How to Think about Things in Themselves: An Essay on Kant's Metaphysics 
and Theory of Cognition. Forthcoming) also notes that the ‘two-world’ title does not fit with Kant’s way of 
individuating worlds. The distinction is not always characterized in the way I give here. Sometimes the one-
world interpretation is described as that which identifies appearances and things-in-themselves, and the two-
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however, so there is really a spectrum of interpretive views here. A one-world interpreter 
might ascribe to Kant the view that (a) each appearance is identical to some thing-in-itself, 
the view that (b) each appearance is some X-as-it-appears, where there is a thing-in-itself that 
is the X-as-it-is-in-itself for the same X, or the view that (c) talk of an appearance is non-
metaphysical talk of an X regarded in a certain way, where one can also talk about that same 
X as a thing-in-itself.
 4
 
Two-world interpreters deny that Kant accepts any of these claims, and then give 
some story about what appearances and things-in-themselves are, and how they relate. This 
story can also take a number of forms, but typically takes all the facts about appearances to be 
based at some level in facts about our representations (while allowing that the facts about our 
representations may themselves be based at some level in facts about things-in-themselves).  
 In what follows, I defend the following argument for the one-world interpretation, 
which I call the One-Self/One-World Argument: 
 
1. The self as it appears and the self as it is in itself are the same thing. 
2. The distinction between the self as it appears and the self as it is in itself is an 
instance of the general appearance/thing-in-itself distinction. 
3. The general appearance/thing-in-itself distinction is metaphysically uniform 
with respect to sameness. 
                                                                                                                                                                     
world interpretation as the denial of this. This characterization is either misleading or too narrow (see following 
fn.). Sometimes the one-world interpretation is characterized as that which holds that appearances are mind-
independent, but this is again too narrow (and, I argue elsewhere, too crude: Colin Marshall, “Qua-objects and 
Kant’s appearance/thing-in-itself distinction”). Lastly, sometimes the two-world interpretation is characterized 
as that which takes appearances to be constructions out of representations, and the one-world as the denial of 
this. This, though, leaves the one-world reading too underspecified (one could deny that appearances are 
constructions without accepting that they are the same things as things-in-themselves). Cf. Ralph Walker: “Kant 
on the Number of Worlds”. In British Journal for the History of Philosophy 18. 2010, 821-843, 826ff.; Dennis 
Schulting: “Kant's Idealism: The Current Debate”. In Kant's Idealism: New Interpretations of a Controversial 
Doctrine. Dordrecht 2011. 
4
 I do not claim that this is an exhaustive taxonomy. (a), (b) and (c) are sometimes treated as equivalent by 
Kant’s commentators, but they are logically distinct. There is related interpretive possibility here that is not 
easily classified: identifying appearances and things-in-themselves with different aspects of the same things (e.g. 
dividing up a thing's properties into two sets, and identifying one set with an appearance and another with a 
thing in itself) while denying that appearances and things-in-themselves are the same things in any important 
sense (e.g. Langton, Rae: Kantian Humility. Oxford 1998, 20). Classification issues aside, such a view would 
also be subject to the argument that follows. 
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4. Therefore, appearances and things-in-themselves are the same things.   
 
The first two premises are self-explanatory. According to the third premise, either all 
instances of the distinction between an appearance and the relevant thing-in-itself (or things-
in-themselves) concern the same thing, or else none do. Given this and the first two premises, 
it follows that all appearances are the same things as the relevant things-in-themselves. 
Below, I defend the One-Self/One-World Argument by clarifying and supporting each 
premise and then considering two possible replies a two-world interpreter might make. 
 Though the unity of the self has informed the development of some one-world 
readings,
5
 the question of how well a two-world reading can make sense of the unified self is 
largely overlooked in the literature. It does not appear, for instance, in Lucy Allais’ careful 
survey of objections to the two-world reading.
6
 Robert Adams and Ralph C. S. Walker note 
that Kant identifies the phenomenal and noumenal selves in his moral philosophy, but neither 
thinks this has any general consequences for the one- vs. two-world debate.
7
 Anja Jauernig, 
in her forthcoming book, points out that this is a consideration that a one-world interpreter 
“might try to spin in his favor”, but thinks that a quick response suffices to dismiss it.8 I 
believe, however, that the One-Self/One-World Argument deals a significant blow to the two-
world reading.  The argument also implies that understanding Kant's metaphysics of the self 
                                                     
5
 For instance, Prauss, Gerold: Kant und das Problem der Dinge an sich. Bonn, 1974;  Allison, Henry: Kant’s 
Theory of Freedom. Cambridge, 1990 (especially Chapter 2); Ameriks, Karl: Kant’s Theory of Mind. Oxford, 
2000 (especially Chapters 6 and 7). In a related vein, Desmond Hogan has recently argued that Kant’s views on 
freedom need to be given a central place in understanding even his basic epistemological claims about things in 
themselves (Hogan, Desmond: “Noumenal affection.” In Philosophical Review 118, 2009, 501-532.). 
6
 Lucy Allais: “Kant’s One World: Interpreting ‘Transcendental Idealism’”. In British Journal for the History of 
Philosophy, 12. 2004. 655–684, 660-665. 
 
7“the moral argument only allows such a [phenomenal-noumenal] identification where rational beings are 
concerned... clearly there can be no prospect of extending the moral argument to cover ordinary physical things” 
(Walker, “Kant on the number of worlds”, 837). See also Robert Adams: "Things In Themselves”. In 
Philosophy and Phenomenological Research 57, 1997, 801-825, 821ff.; Karl Ameriks: Interpreting Kant's 
Critiques. Oxford 2003, 84; and Wagner, Hans: “Kants affirmative Metaphysik von Dingen an sich”. In Zu 
Kants Kritischer Philosophie. Würzberg 2008, 76-77. Interpreters who are aware of the potential force of this 
criticism of two-world readings include Allen Wood, Tobias Rosefeldt, and Henry Allison (Wood, Allen: Kant. 
Oxford. 2005, 74; Rosefeldt, Tobias: “Dinge an sich und sekundäre Qualitäten”. In Kant in der Gegenwart, ed. 
By J. Stolzenburg. Berlin and New York 2007, 167–209, 170, Allison, Henry: Essays on Kant. Oxford 2012, 
80). None of these interpreters fully develop the criticism, however.  
8
 Jauernig, How to Think about Things in Themselves.  
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is more directly relevant to interpreting his transcendental idealism than many of his readers 
have assumed. 
One caveat: my argument rests on a fairly weak assumption of charity. I do not 
assume that Kant is perfectly consistent. All my argument assumes is that there is broad 
consistency between those core pieces of Kant’s philosophy whose interrelations he explicitly 
and repeatedly discusses. Kant may well have changed his mind about many aspects of his 
idealism, but the premises of the One-Self/One-World Argument rest on tenets of his 
philosophy that we find throughout his mature works. 
 
1. The self as it appears and the self as it is in itself are the same thing  
 
 Kant ascribes both phenomenal and noumenal aspects to us. In the relevant passages, 
he uses several notions for ‘us’: the I, the self, the subject, the mind, the person and the 
human. Though there are important differences between these, I use 'self' as a blanket term in 
what follows.
9
 
 How many selves are there, then? The common-sense view is that each of us has 
exactly one self. All of Kant's major philosophical predecessors accepted this, though they 
made sense of it in different ways. If Kant had rejected this ‘single self' view, we would 
expect him to do so explicitly. Yet in the overwhelming majority of places where Kant 
discusses the self, he talks about a single thing.
10
 Only on rare occasions does he use qualified 
terminology (e.g. explicitly restricting a claim to the self as it appears or as it is in itself), and 
his talk of distinct selves is rarer still. Despite this, many of Kant’s commentators imply that 
he consistently distinguishes the phenomenal/empirical self from the noumenal/intelligible 
self. James Van Cleve, for instance, states:  
                                                     
9
 Kant’s notion of the self involves more detail than I can properly discuss here. I discuss the relevant 
distinctions in Colin Marshall: “Kant’s metaphysics of the self”. In Philosophers’ Imprint 10, 2010, 1-21, 2. 
Perhaps the most obvious distinction concerns whether just the appearances of inner sense are included (as is 
true of the mind), or also those of outer sense (as is true of the embodied human being). On the (at least 
possible) unity of the thinking self with the body Kant says: “I can [..]. assume that [...] the very same thing that 
is called a body in one relation would at the same time be a thinking being in another” (“kann ich [...] annehmen 
[...] [daß] was in einer Beziehung körperlich heißt, in einer andern zugleich ein denkend Wesen sein”) (KrV, 
A359). 
10
 This is also true of his pre-critical work. See Klemme, Heiner: Kants Philosophie des Subjects. Hamburg. 
1995, 38-138 and Wuerth, Julian: “Kant's Immediatism, Pre-Critique”. In Journal of the History of Philosophy 
44, 2006, 489-532. 
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Kant speaks of three different selves: the empirical self, the transcendental self, and the 
noumenal self. The empirical self is the self as encountered in introspection... The 
transcendental self is the subject of all the states just mentioned: it is the thinker of our 
thoughts, the haver of our experiences, the willer of our actions, and perhaps also the 
agent of the various activities of synthesis Kant talks about... the noumenal self is the 
‘self in itself’ – the real self or the self as it really is.11 
 
This is misleading. Kant almost never talks of distinct selves.
12
 In fact, the phrases 'empirical 
self,' 'transcendental self,' and 'noumenal self' appear nowhere in any of the Critiques. One 
could respond that Kant only makes the relevant distinctions (perhaps in other terms) when 
he is being ‘serious,’ and that his usual talk of a single self is merely for presentational 
purposes. But the text does not support this response. For instance, in the dense discussion of 
inner sense and apperception in §25 of the B Deduction, Kant writes that “[i]n the 
transcendental synthesis of the manifold of representations in general... I am conscious of 
myself not as I appear to myself, nor as I am in myself, but only that I am” (B157).13 This is 
surely a serious discussion of the self, and yet Kant writes of a single self that is intuited, 
thought, appears, and is in itself. To be sure, whether we should take Kant at his word hinges 
                                                     
11
 James Van Cleve: Problems from Kant. Oxford. 1999, 182. Van Cleve goes on to argue (quite plausibly) that 
the noumenal and transcendental selves are the same (Van Cleve, ibid. 182-85), but maintains a radical 
distinction between these and the empirical self. See also Schulting, “Kant’s Idealism”, 168-170. This 
assumption is reflected in what is described as the issue of ‘Kant’s third self.’ See Kitcher, Patricia: “Kant’s 
Real Self”. In Self and Nature in Kant’s Philosophy. Ithaca. 1984, 113-147, 113 and Zöller, Gunter: “Main 
Developments in Recent Scholarship on the Critique of Pure Reason”. In Philosophy and Phenomenological 
Research 53. 1993, 445-66. 
12
 At GMS 4:457, Kant writes of the human having his 'proper self' in the intelligible world, but the context 
makes it clear that the human being is one thing, also having a phenomenal side. KprV 5:161 talks of the 
'invisible self,' but this is an invisible self that is said to belong to someone who also has an animal nature. Kant 
does (as we will see below) talk of us having distinct phenomenal and noumenal characters, but he consistently 
ascribes those characters to a single entity (the self). In FM/Lose Blätter 20:338, Kant does talk of the 
“empirical I” (“das empirische Ich”) vs. the “rational I” (“das rationale Ich”) and of the “logical I” (“das 
logische Ich”) vs. the “physical self” (“das physische selbst”), but simultaneously appeals to the identity of the 
self.  
13KrV, B157: “Dagegen bin ich mir meiner selbst in der transcendentalen Synthesis des Mannigfaltigen der 
Vorstellungen überhaupt [...] bewußt, nicht wie ich mir erscheine, noch wie ich an mir selbst bin, sondern nur 
daß ich bin”. See also KprV 5:114, 5:97 and 5:105. 
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on whether we can make philosophical sense of there being a single self that has both 
phenomenal and noumenal aspects, but it is plausible that this can be done.
14
 I say a bit more 
at the end of this section about the textual constraints on how to understand the singleness of 
the self. 
 It is possible that Van Cleve and others have been misled by Kant’s distinctions 
between types of self-representation. Kant distinguishes empirical apperception and inner 
sense from pure apperception, for instance (e.g. KrV A107, B132), but this no more implies 
that there is more than one type of self than the fact that there are empirical and pure concepts 
of objects by itself implies that there is more than one type of object.
15 
 
 The textual grounds for the first premise are therefore extremely strong. We find more 
systematic grounds in the central themes of Kant's practical philosophy.
16
 Two strands of the 
practical philosophy are directly relevant: our necessitation by objective practical laws 
(Kant's view of duty), and our actions' having both empirical and non-empirical causes 
(Kant's compatibilism). I focus on the issue of practical necessitation here, returning to 
compatibilism in the next section.
17
 
 According to Kant, our relation to objective practical laws is halfway between the 
relation a (non-empirical) divine being has to them and the relation a non-rational animal has. 
A divine being's actions are directly determined by its representation of these laws (cf. GMS 
4:414). A non-rational animal has no representation of these laws, and acts merely on the 
basis of empirical incentives (cf. KprV 5:61). The human will is subject to both rational and 
                                                     
14
 For one approach, see my “Kant’s metaphysics of the self”.  
15
 See Klemme, Kants Philosophie des Subjekts, 214ff. At 7:142 in the Anthropology, Kant claims that “I as a 
thinking being am one and the same subject with myself as a sensing being” (Anth, 7:142: “Ich, als denkendes 
Wesen, bin zwar mit Mir, als Sinnenwesen, ein und dasselbe Subjekt”.) and in the next paragraph complains 
about psychologists who confuse inner sense with apperception. So Kant clearly distinguished the question of 
how many types of self-representation there are from the question of how many selves there are.  
16
 There are also systematic grounds in the theoretical works. The unity of the sensible and non-sensible sides of 
the self seems to be at the core of the Transcendental Deduction (e.g. KrV, A107, B140), and the Third Analogy 
hinges on the experiencing self entering into causal relations with empirical objects (KrV, A213/B260).  
17
 Walker, “Kant on the number of worlds”, 836 argues that some close tie between the phenomenal and 
noumenal selves is needed for cross-temporal ascriptions of moral responsibility to human beings. I think this 
argument is basically right, though a two-world interpreter who was willing to claim knowledge of noumenal 
identities could respond that Kant’s view was just that a certain noumenal self accompanied the human body 
without being the same thing as it. 
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non-rational forces, however.18 Kant describes this view in grandiose terms at the end of the 
second Critique: 
 
Two things fill the mind with ever new and increasing admiration and reverence... the 
starry heavens above me and the moral law within me [...] The first begins from the place 
I occupy in the external world of sense [...] The second begins from my invisible self, my 
personality, and presents me in a world which has true infinity but which can be 
discovered only by the understanding, and I cognize that my connection with that world 
(and thereby with all those visible worlds as well) is not merely contingent, as in the first 
case, but universal and necessary. The first [...] annihilates, as it were, my importance as 
an animal creature [...] The second, on the contrary, infinitely raises my worth as an 
intelligence by my personality, in which the moral law reveals to me a life independent 
of animality and even of the whole sensible world
19 
 
As Kant describes it, then, our distinctive status hinges on our being both phenomenal and 
noumenal. So, if we take him at his word, it is crucial to Kant's central philosophical concerns 
that the self is a single thing with both noumenal and phenomenal sides. Matters would be 
different if there were two selves, a noumenal and a phenomenal one. That would seem to be 
more like a case of an angel pushing around an animal. In the Metaphysics of Morals, Kant is 
clear that the singleness of the self is crucial to understanding our duties: 
 
The subject that is bound, as well as the subject that binds, is always the human being 
only; and though we may, in a theoretical respect, distinguish soul and body from each 
other, as natural characteristics of a human being, we may not think of them as different 
                                                     
18
 See, e.g., GMS, 4:413, KprV, 5:20, MS, 6:387, 6:420 
19
KprV, 5:161-62: “Zwei Dinge erfüllen das Gemüth mit immer neuer und zunehmender Bewunderung und 
Ehrfurcht [...] der bestirnte Himmel über mir und das moralische Gesetz in mir. [...] Das erste fängt von dem 
Platze an, den ich in der äußern Sinnenwelt einnehme [...] Das zweite fängt von meinem unsichtbaren Selbst, 
meiner Persönlichkeit, an und stellt mich in einer Welt dar, die wahre Unendlichkeit hat, aber nur dem Verstande 
spürbar ist, und mit welcher (dadurch aber auch zugleich mit allen jenen sichtbaren Welten) ich mich nicht wie 
dort in blos zufälliger, sondern allgemeiner und nothwendiger Verknüpfung erkenne. Der erstere Anblick [...] 
vernichtet gleichsam meine Wichtigkeit, als eines thierischen Geschöpfs [...] Der zweite erhebt dagegen meinen 
Werth, als einer Intelligenz, unendlich durch meine Persönlichkeit, in welcher das moralische Gesetz mir ein [...] 
von der ganzen Sinnenwelt unabhängiges Leben offenbart”. See also KU, 5:403. 
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substances putting him under obligation, so as to justify a division of duties to the body 
and duties to the soul 
20 
 
It would be a serious cost to an interpretation it could not make sense of this tenet of Kant's 
practical philosophy.
21
 As I emphasized earlier, moreover, such an interpretation would be 
forced to reject the natural reading of vast amounts of text. In slogan form: dividing the self is 
deeply un-Kantian.
 22
 
 In what follows, it will help to have a clear sense of how Kant describes the dual 
character and singleness of the self, though I continue to remain neutral on how that 
singleness should be understood. Two of the clearest formulations appear in the resolution to 
the Third Antinomy: 
 
for a subject of the world of sense we would have first an empirical character [...]  one 
would also have to allow this subject an intelligible character, through which it is indeed 
the cause of those actions as appearances, but which does not stand under any conditions 
of sensibility and is not itself appearance. The first one could call the character of such a 
thing in appearance, the second its character as a thing in itself.
23 
 
                                                     
20
MS, 6:418-19: “Das verpflichtete sowohl als das verpflichtende Subject ist immer nur der Mensch, und wenn 
es uns in theoretischer Rücksicht gleich erlaubt ist im Menschen Seele und Körper als Naturbeschaffenheiten des 
Menschen von einander zu unterscheiden, so ist es doch nicht erlaubt sie als verschiedene den Menschen 
verpflichtende Substanzen zu denken, um zur Eintheilung in Pflichten gegen den Körper und gegen die Seele 
berechtigt zu sein”. 
21
 For a helpful discussion, see Chapter 3 of Marcus Willaschek: Praktische Vernunft. Handlungstheorie und 
Moralbegründung bei Kant. Stuttgart/Weimar. 1992. 
22
 Another interpretive route is to deny that the self is a thing at all (e.g. P. F. Strawson: The Bounds of Sense. 
London. 1966, 166), in which case there would be no issue of unity. This interpretation is hard to motivate, 
though (cf. Robert Howell” “Kant, the ‘I think,’ and self-awareness”. In Kant’s Legacy, ed. by P. Cicovacki. 
Rochester. 2001, 117-152, 121, and my “Kant’s metaphysics of the self”, 8-9. 
23KrV, A539/B567: “da würden wir an einem Subjecte der Sinnenwelt erstlich einen empirischen Charakter 
haben [...]Zweitens würde man ihm noch einen intelligibelen Charakter einräumen müssen, dadurch es zwar die 
Ursache jener Handlungen als Erscheinungen ist, der aber selbst unter keinen Bedingungen der Sinnlichkeit steht 
und selbst nicht Erscheinung ist. Man könnte auch den ersteren den Charakter eines solchen Dinges in der 
Erscheinung, den zweiten den Charakter des Dinges an sich selbst nennen.” 
9 
 
the human being [...] is in one part phenomenon, but in another part [understanding and 
reason] he is a merely intelligible object
24 
 
These passages describe the issue in metaphysical terms. In the first passage, Kant claims that 
the subject has two characters, an intelligible one and an empirical one. This fits reasonably 
well with the formulation in the second passage, where he talks of the human having parts. I 
refer to these below as 'two-part' formulations of the singleness of the dual-character self. 
 Kant also ascribes the dual character to a single faculty of the self (the will): 
 
just the same will is thought of in the appearance (in visible actions) as necessarily 
subject to the law of nature and to this extent not free, while yet on the other hand it is 
thought of as belonging to a thing in itself as not subject to that law, and hence as free
25 
 
one can consider the causality of this being in two aspects, as intelligible in its action as a 
thing in itself, and as sensible in the effects of that action as an appearance in the world 
of sense.
 26 
 
I do not think much turns on whether one privileges talk of duality of the self or talk of the 
duality of the will; if the will can be both phenomenal and noumenal without losing its unity, 
then the unified self can likewise be phenomenal and noumenal. The feature of these 
formulations that does merit attention is their use of representational terms: the will is 
'thought of as' or 'considered as' phenomenal or as noumenal. Different one-world 
interpretations take this use of representational terms more or less metaphysically. Without 
taking a stand on that question, I refer to this latter sort of formulations as 'two-aspect' 
formulations of the singleness of the self. 
                                                     
24KrV, A546/B574: “der Mensch [...] ist sich selbst freilich eines Theils Phänomen, anderen Theils aber, nämlich 
in Ansehung gewisser Vermögen, ein bloß intelligibeler Gegenstand”. 
25
 KrV, Bxxvii-xxviiii: “so wird eben derselbe Wille in der Erscheinung (den sichtbaren Handlungen) als dem 
Naturgesetze nothwendig gemäß und so fern nicht frei und doch andererseits als einem Dinge an sich selbst 
angehörig jenem nicht unterworfen, mithin als frei gedacht”. 
26
 KrV, A538/B566: “so kann man die Causalität dieses Wesens auf zwei Seiten betrachten, als intelligibel nach 
ihrer Handlung als eines Dinges an sich selbst, und als sensibel nach den Wirkungen derselben als einer 
Erscheinung in der Sinnenwelt.” In the Vigilantius lectures, Kant says that our power of choice is “partim 
sensualis, partim intellectualis” (V-MS/Vigil, 29:1016). In addition to two-aspect talk (e.g. KprV, 5:114), the 
second Critique also talks of one and the same being belonging to two worlds (see KprV, 5:105).  
10 
 
 Of course, one could doubt whether the above passages should be read literally. In 
fact, the following sections show that a two-world interpreter has reason to find some non-
literal readings. The onus, though, would be for the two-world interpreter to defend a non-
literal reading and to show that it does not face an analogue of the following problems. 
 
2. The distinction between the self as it appears and the self as it is in itself is an instance 
of the general distinction between appearances and things-in-themselves 
  
 A two-world interpreter might respond at this point by insisting that the 
appearance/thing-in-itself distinction just has a different meaning when applied to the self 
than when applied to other entities. I suspect that many interpreters have been attracted by 
this line of thought. It is important to recognize, then, that the text does not support it. There 
is both a general and a specific textual argument for the claim that Kant takes himself to be 
univocally applying the appearance/thing-in-itself distinction to the self and to other entities. 
 The general argument is this: throughout all of his mature writings, Kant uses the 
same terminology in discussing the phenomenal/noumenal aspects of the self and in 
discussing the phenomenal/noumenal aspects of other entities. Were it the case that he really 
has in mind two different distinctions, we would expect him to clarify this at some point: 
Kant rarely shies away from making distinctions among distinctions. 
 The specific textual argument stems from passages where Kant directly applies the 
general distinction to the self. Such direct application suggests that he thinks there is nothing 
distinctive about the meaning of the distinction in the case of the self.  
 This direct application is conspicuous in Kant's discussions of his compatibilism. 
Here are three relevant passages. The first appears in the B Preface: 
 
if the critique has not erred in teaching that the object should be taken in a twofold 
meaning, namely as appearance or as thing in itself; if its deduction of the pure concepts 
of the understanding is correct, and hence the principle of causality applies only to things 
taken in the first sense, namely insofar as they are objects of experience, while things in 
the second meaning are not subject to it; then just the same will is thought of in the 
appearance (in visible actions) as necessarily subject to the law of nature and to this 
extent not free, while yet on the other hand it is thought of as belonging to a thing in 
11 
 
itself as not subject to that law, and hence as free, without any contradiction hereby 
occurring
27 
 
Kant begins with the general appearance/thing-in-itself distinction, and directly moves to the 
case of the single will. Indeed, as the B Preface paints it, part of Kant's motivation for 
generally distinguishing appearances from things-in-themselves is to make room for his 
compatibilism. If that is right, then it is crucial that the application of the distinction be 
univocal.  
 We see the same pattern in the resolution to the Third Antinomy. At the beginning of 
the section, “The possibility of causality through freedom united with the universal law of 
natural necessity,” Kant writes: 
 
I call intelligible that in an object of sense which is not itself appearance. Accordingly, if 
that which must be regarded as appearance in the world of sense has in itself a faculty 
which is not an object of intuition through which it can be the cause of appearances, then 
one can consider the causality of this being in two aspects, as intelligible in its action as a 
thing in itself, and as sensible in the effects of that action as an appearance in the world 
of sense [...] [this] does not contradict any of the concepts we have to form of appearance 
and of a possible experience.  For since these appearances, because they are not things in 
themselves, must be grounded in a transcendental object [...] nothing hinders us from 
ascribing to this transcendental object, apart from the property through which it appears, 
another causality that is not appearance
28 
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KrV, Bxxvii-xxviii “Wenn aber die Kritik nicht geirrt hat, da sie das Object in zweierlei Bedeutung nehmen 
lehrt, nämlich als Erscheinung oder als Ding an sich selbst; wenn die Deduction ihrer Verstandesbegriffe richtig 
ist [...] so wird eben derselbe Wille in der Erscheinung [...] als dem Naturgesetze nothwendig gemäß und so fern 
nicht frei und doch andererseits als einem Dinge an sich selbst angehörig jenem nicht unterworfen, mithin als 
frei gedacht, ohne daß hierbei ein Widerspruch vorgeht” (my emphasis). Another telling passage comes just 
before at KrV Bxxvii. 
28
KrV, A538-39/B566-67: “Ich nenne dasjenige an einem Gegenstande der Sinne, was selbst nicht 
Erscheinung ist, intelligibel. Wenn demnach dasjenige, was in der Sinnenwelt als Erscheinung angesehen 
werden muß, an sich selbst auch ein Vermögen hat, welches kein Gegenstand der sinnlichen Anschauung 
ist [...] so kann man die Causalität dieses Wesens auf zwei Seiten betrachten, als intelligibel nach ihrer 
Handlung als eines Dinges an sich selbst, und als sensibel nach den Wirkungen derselben als einer 
Erscheinung in der Sinnenwelt [...] [Diese] widerspricht keinem von den Begriffen, die wir uns von 
Erscheinungen und von einer möglichen Erfahrung zu machen haben. Denn da diesen, weil sie an sich 
keine Dinge sind, ein transscendentaler Gegenstand zum Grunde liegen muß, der sie als bloße 
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So here again Kant uses his general distinctions (intelligible vs. sensible, appearance vs. 
thing-in-itself) to open a careful discussion of compatibilism that was preserved in both 
editions of the Critique. That compatibilism is consistently described as applying to a single 
self. 
 The third illustrative passage comes from the third part of the Groundwork: 
 
all representations which come to us involuntarily (as do those of the senses) enable us to 
cognize objects only as they affect us and we remain ignorant of what they may be in 
themselves... As soon as this distinction has once been made […] then it follows of itself 
that we must admit and assume behind appearances something else that is not 
appearance, namely things in themselves [...] This must yield a distinction, although a 
crude one, between a world of sense and the world of understanding, the first of which 
can be very different according to the difference of sensibility in various observers of the 
world while the second, which is its basis, always remains the same. Even as to himself, 
the human being cannot claim to cognize what he is in himself through the cognizance he 
has by inner sensation 
29 
 
Unlike the second Critique, the Groundwork avoids explicit appeals to the doctrines of the 
first Critique. So if Kant took the appearance/thing-in-itself distinction to apply differently to 
the self than to other entities, we would expect him to only introduce it with respect to the 
self here and to stay silent on the general nature of objects. Instead, he provides the general 
distinction, and then considers the self as a special case.  
 In fact, it is plausible that the instance where Kant most cared about the 
appearance/thing-in-itself distinction was with the self, since he sometimes suggests that the 
                                                                                                                                                                     
Vorstellungen bestimmt, so hindert nichts, daß wir diesem transscendentalen Gegenstande [...] nicht auch 
eine Causalität beilegen sollten, die nicht Erscheinung ist”. 
29
GMS, 4:450-51: “Es ist eine Bemerkung, welche anzustellen eben kein subtiles Nachdenken erfordert wird 
[…] daß alle Vorstellungen, die uns ohne unsere Willkür kommen (wie die der Sinne), uns die Gegenstände 
nicht anders zu erkennen geben, als sie uns afficiren, wobei, was sie an sich sein mögen, uns unbekannt bleibt 
[…] Sobald dieser Unterschied […] einmal gemacht ist, so folgt von selbst, daß man hinter den Erscheinungen 
doch noch etwas anderes, was nicht Erscheinung ist, nämlich die Dinge an sich, einräumen und annehmen müsse 
[…] Dieses muß eine, obzwar rohe, Unterscheidung einer Sinnenwelt von der Verstandeswelt abgeben […] 
Sogar sich selbst und zwar nach der Kenntniß, die der Mensch durch innere Empfindung von sich hat, darf er 
sich nicht anmaßen zu erkennen, wie er an sich selbst sei.” see also Prol, 4:337. 
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core claims of his moral philosophy are of greater importance than those of his theoretical 
philosophy.
30
 If that is right, then, contrary to the usual pattern of discussion, the self should 
be the starting place for understanding the distinction. 
 Regardless of whether we accept this last claim, it should be clear that if we accept 
that the appearance/thing-in-itself distinction is univocal, and accept the claim of the first 
premise of the One-Self/One-World Argument (namely, that the phenomenal and noumenal 
selves are the same thing), then there is at least a prima facie case for accepting the core 
claim of the one-world interpretation.  
 
3. The general appearance/thing-in-itself distinction is metaphysically uniform with 
respect to sameness. 
 
 Even granting the first two premises of the One-Self/One-World Argument, it might 
still seem that a two-world interpreter could insist that the general appearance/thing-in-itself 
distinction can (without equivocation) be applied both to relata that are the same thing (in 
some relevant sense) or to relata that are different things. To deny the third premise in this 
way, the two-world interpreter might appeal to an analogy: there is a general distinction 
between prime ministers and historians, but the fact that Winston Churchill the prime 
minister was the same thing (person) as Winston Churchill the historian does not show that 
Tony Blair is the same person as some historian. Though univocal, the prime 
minister/historian distinction is not metaphysically uniform with respect to sameness. If the 
appearance/thing-in-itself distinction were structurally similar, then it could the case that the 
self alone was both appearance and thing-in-itself. 
 As before, there are both general and specific reasons for accepting the third premise. 
The general reason is as follows. The appearance/thing-in-itself distinction is a fundamental 
metaphysical distinction in Kant's philosophy. Generally, if a metaphysical distinction is 
fundamental, then it is metaphysically uniform with respect to sameness (e.g. nothing is both 
abstract and concrete, nothing is both universal and particular). Part of the reason for this is 
that non-uniform distinctions are typically explained in terms of more fundamental 
distinctions, so we should expect uniformity at the fundamental level. All this implies that the 
appearance/thing-in-itself distinction is uniform with respect to sameness. 
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 E.g. KrV, Bxxix-xxx. 
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 The more specific reasons for accepting the third premise are the focus of the rest of 
this section. Returning to the above example: if one spells out the prime minister/historian 
distinction, it becomes clear why it can apply in the way that it does: being a historian is 
about studying history, being a prime minister is about occupying a certain role in a 
government. These properties are compatible (unlike the properties involved in, e.g., the 
prime number/prime minister distinction) but have no direct entailment relations (unlike the 
properties involved in, e.g., the prime number/natural number distinction). So the two-world 
interpreter needs to show that the appearance/thing-in-itself distinction is like the prime 
minister/historian distinction, by spelling out the notions of appearances and things-in-
themselves in such a way that the relevant properties are compatible without one entailing the 
another (in particular, without ‘is an appearance’ entailing ‘is a thing in itself’). The two-
world interpreter needs compatibility in order to accept the unity of the self, and needs non-
entailment in order to distinguish her view from the one-world interpretation. My main 
contention in this section is that the two-world interpreter cannot spell out the distinction in 
the needed way.  
 These concerns bear differently on different versions of the two-world interpretation. 
Instead of trying to survey all versions of this interpretation, I focus on what is probably the 
most influential version in the current literature, and certainly one of the most clear: that of 
James Van Cleve. By the end of the section, it should be obvious how my challenge 
generalizes to other versions of the two-world reading.  
 Van Cleve motivates his two-world reading by appealing to a metaphysical principle: 
“An object can depend on us for its Sosein (its being the way it is) only if it also depends on 
us for its Sein (its being, period).”31 I take it that what Van Cleve means is that if an object 
has a mind-dependent property, then its existence is mind-dependent. Mind-dependent 
existence would mean that the object’s existence (the entire object, not just some aspects or 
parts of it) is metaphysically downstream from that of the mind. Van Cleve takes appearances 
to have mind-dependent properties. Given the principle, this entails that their existence is 
mind-dependent. Since the existence of things-in-themselves is mind-independent,
32
 and the 
same thing cannot have both a mind-dependent and a mind-independent existence, it would 
then follow that appearances and things-in-themselves are not the same things.  
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 Van Cleve, Problems from Kant, 5 
32
 Some of Kant’s readers have denied that things-in-themselves are mind-independent (e.g. Pogge, Thomas: 
“Erscheinungen und Dinge an sich”. In Zeitschrift für philosophische Forschung 45. 1991, 489-510), but this is 
a minority view.  
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 However, consider what happens if we apply this principle to the self as appearance 
(what Van Cleve calls 'the empirical self'). Being an appearance, this self has mind-dependent 
properties (e.g. temporality). As we have seen, there is only a single self. So Van Cleve's 
principle entails that the self has a mind-dependent existence, so that the self's existence is 
metaphysically downstream from that of the mind. But for Kant, the self just is the mind, and 
the same thing cannot be metaphysically downstream from itself. Given the singleness of the 
self, Van Cleve's principle thus leads to absurdity.
33
 If something like this principle has 
motivated other two-world interpretations, the singleness of the self undermines their 
motivation as well. 
 The central claim of Van Cleve’s interpretation does not require the Sosein-Sein 
principle, however. That claim is that appearances are virtual objects. According to Van 
Cleve, to say that a “virtual object of a certain sort (e.g., a patch of red) exists is shorthand for 
saying that a certain kind of representation occurs.”34 Virtual objects have an ontological 
status quite different from non-virtual objects: “We would not quantify over virtual objects in 
an ontologically perspicuous language.”35 On this interpretation, it is clear that appearances 
are in no important sense the same things as things-in-themselves, since (assuming we could 
refer to them) we surely would quantify over things-in-themselves in an ontologically 
perspicuous language. This would show that being an appearance does not entail being a 
thing-in-itself (the relevant non-entailment). 
 Yet this way of understanding the appearances/things-in-themselves distinction makes 
it hard to see how there could be an instance in which a single thing was both phenomenal 
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 There are direct grounds for rejecting the principle, if 'being, period' is taken strongly. A statue is dependent 
on a sculptor for its Sosein. Yet the statue's clay clearly doesn't depend on the sculptor. This suggests that 
objects can have dependent properties while having independent constituents. I think this is in fact the right way 
to think about objects for Kant (and argue for it in “Qua-objects and Kant’s appearance/thing-in-itself 
distinction). Less interestingly, there are challenges to Van Cleve's principle if 'the way it is' includes all 
properties; surely an object can depend on us for its name (e.g. 'Mount Taylor') without depending on us for its 
existence. This challenge could be met by restricting the principle to a certain set of important properties (Mike 
Raven suggested to me: essential properties), but since all the important properties of the phenomenal self 
depend on the noumenal self, such a move would not help with the objection that follows. 
34
 Van Cleve, Problems from Kant, 8-9.  
35
 Van Cleve, Problems from Kant, 11. 
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and noumenal (i.e. the compatibility of these properties), as the self surely is.
36
 This is easiest 
to see with the two-part formulations of the self. If the self has a phenomenal part and a 
noumenal part, then phenomenal and noumenal things must be able to stand in some kind of 
composition relation. But it is implausible that any composition relation can hold between 
things we would quantify over and things we would not. Even contemporary metaphysicians 
who favor unrestricted views of composition (which Kant certainly did not
37
) tend to see 
composition as only holding between entities of the same general category, and none that I 
know of accept composition relations between entities we ultimately would quantify over and 
those we would not.
38
 Therefore, the more metaphysically dissimilar the phenomenal and 
noumenal are, the harder it becomes to see how one thing could have phenomenal and 
noumenal parts. Van Cleve makes them radically dissimilar, so the problem is especially 
acute for his reading. 
 Kant does allow that one type of composition relation can hold between parts of 
somewhat different natures: what he calls the combination of homogeneous vs. non-
homogeneous manifolds (cf. KrV B201-202n.). But his examples of non-homogeneous 
combination (what he calls 'nexus') are the traditional ones: substance/accident, cause/effect.  
Nothing suggests that he would accept combinations of virtual objects with non-virtual 
objects. One might think that Van Cleve could respond by subsuming the noumenal-
self/phenomenal-self relation to either the substance/accident relation or to the cause/effect 
relation, but this would quickly lead to a general one-world view. For if the phenomenal self 
stands in one of these relations to the noumenal self, then surely every appearances stands in 
that relation to something noumenal. Any principle a committed two-world interpreter can 
find to unify the phenomenal and noumenal sides of the self must be a principle that does not 
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 Van Cleve explicitly applies the 'virtual object' reading to the empirical self (Van Cleve, Problems from Kant, 
186). He himself seems to see no reason to connect the empirical and noumenal selves (ibid., 300). So Van 
Cleve is consistent in his interpretation, but does not appreciate the cost of denying the singleness of the self. 
37
 Cf. Kant's insistence on the conditions of unity of representations (e.g. B129-30). The weakest example of 
combination Kant recognizes is that of “the two triangles into which a square is divided by the diagonal” 
(B201n.). For a helpful discussion, see David Bell: “Some Kantian thoughts on propositional unity”. In 
Proceedings of the Aristotelian Society, Supp. Volumes 75, 2001, 1-16. 
38
 David Lewis takes an extremely permissive view, allowing mereological relations between concrete 
particulars and abstracta (Lewis, David: On the Plurality of Worlds. Oxford. 1986, 212. Even the extremely 
permissive view, however, falls short of what Van Cleve would need. For a relevant discussion, see Hudson, 
Hud: “Confining composition”. In Journal of Philosophy 103, 2006, 631-651. The point applies even more 
strongly to identity relations. Cf. Walker, “Kant on the number of worlds”, 825.  
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lead to a general unification of the phenomenal and the noumenal. Otherwise, the result 
would be a one-world interpretation. 
 The objection in the previous two paragraphs relied on the two-part formulations of 
the self's unity. The same objection applies if we consider the two-aspect formulations. It 
might seem that the ‘considered as’ and ’thought as’ locutions in these formulations provide 
Van Cleve with a way of uniting the self. For a single entity can indeed be considered in very 
different ways. If we, say, construe Van Cleve’s ‘virtual objects’ along the lines of fictional 
entities, then we could say that the phenomenal self is something like a fictional version of 
the noumenal self. There would be nothing incoherent about that: The Social Network may or 
may not be largely fictional, but there is no doubt that its main character is (in some 
important sense) the same person as the non-fictional CEO of Facebook. 
 But in virtue of what is the self-considered-as-phenomenal the same thing as the self-
considered-as-noumenal? With The Social Network, there are several factors that make it 
clear that the Mark Zuckerberg of the film is the same person as the CEO of Facebook: they 
have the same name, there is significant resemblance between the properties and history of 
the two, and the film-makers clearly intended the film to be about the CEO of Facebook. But 
nothing along these lines would help connect the phenomenal self with the noumenal self: the 
noumenal self does not have a name, has radically different properties from the phenomenal 
self, and there is nobody who intends the phenomenal self to be the same as the noumenal 
self.
39
 
 None of this shows that that there is no relation between the phenomenal and 
noumenal selves that might unite them by making the phenomenal about the latter. After all, 
there are textual reasons to say that noumenal self grounds the phenomenal self, affects the 
latter, etc. But, again, these relations are ones that hold quite generally between phenomena 
and noumena,
40
 so they if are enough to unify the self, they will unify phenomena and 
noumena more generally. 
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 These same points apply to Wilfred Sellars' suggestion that the phenomenal/noumenal distinction is the 
Cartesian objective/formal distinction (Sellars, Wilfred: Science and Metaphysics: Variations on Kantian 
Themes. London. 1968, 31). For Descartes himself sets limits to how far the objective reality and formal reality 
of an object can diverge (cf. the discussion of the most universal things in Meditation I, and the argument for 
God’s existence in Meditation III). 
40
 This is especially clear in the Fourth Paralogism in the A edition (e.g. KrV A379-80), even though this is a 
passage often cited in support of the two-world reading. 
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 Nothing requires a two-world interpreter to follow Van Cleve in making appearances 
and things-in-themselves so radically different. I see no principled way to show that there 
could not be a two-world reading that can answer the challenge I have described. But it is 
clear that the basic premise of the two-world reading puts it in a difficult position. The 
strength of Van Cleve’s virtual-objects approach is that it shows how appearances and things-
in-themselves cannot be the same things – indeed, this is part of what makes his two-world 
reading admirably clear. Yet this same feature of this interpretation forces him to reject the 
unity of the self. If a two-world interpreter departs from Van Cleve, however, and attempts to 
unify the self with a weaker understanding of the distinction or with any of the obvious 
relations between the phenomenal and noumenal selves to unify them (substance/attribute, 
cause/effect, grounder/grounded), then the view will collapse into a one-world view.
41
 
 That completes my primary defense of the One-Self/One-World Argument. There are, 
I think, two initially plausible replies a two-world interpreter might make. These are the topic 
of the next section. 
   
Two Replies 
 
Reply 1: Unique features of the self  
A two-world interpreter might respond to the above by claiming that there is 
something unique about the self that makes for a unified phenomenal-noumenal entity in that 
case alone. In general, this line of response must contend with the second and third premises 
of the One-Self/One-World Argument: since Kant repeatedly treats the appearance/in-itself 
distinction as applying univocally and uniformly, this suggests there is nothing distinctive 
about how the distinction applies to selves. In addition, Kant begins all of his major works 
with the assumption of a single self firmly in place. If the two-world view were correct, but 
Kant had some reason for making the self an exception (in being the only case of a thing that 
is both phenomenal and noumenal), we would expect him to explicitly introduce and 
motivate that exception somewhere. But he does not.  
Since a two-world interpreter might insist that the interpretation has enough virtues to 
make up for those textual problems, however, we should consider how far this reply might go 
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 Though my focus here has been metaphysical, there are difficult epistemological issues in the vicinity. Given 
Kant’s epistemological strictures, we should ask how he would be entitled to make claims about the connections 
between noumena and phenomena (cf. Klemme, Kants Philosophie des Subjekts, 245-270).  
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if we set them aside. To be clear, what is needed is some basis for saying that the phenomenal 
self is united to the noumenal self that does not imply that phenomenal things generally are 
united to noumenal things. Moreover, it would seem that (unlike Schopenhauer) Kant thinks 
that different phenomenal selves are united to different noumenal selves, and the reply needs 
to make room for that. It would not do to, say, to claim that a given phenomenal self is united 
to a certain noumenal self because they both have some structural feature, unless that 
structural feature is had only by that particular phenomenal self and that particular noumenal 
self. Otherwise, it could immediately follow that have all phenomenal selves have the same 
noumenal self. 
There are no absolute philosophical obstacles to making this reply work within those 
constraints. The most straightforward approach would be for a two-world interpreter to say 
that, for each phenomenal self, it is a brute fact that it is united to certain noumenal self in a 
way that phenomenal things other than selves are never united to noumena. A two-world 
interpretation that appealed to such brute facts would be internally coherent. It would, 
however, be mysterious and ad hoc.
42
 
It would be more satisfying if the two-world interpreter could identify features of the 
phenomenal and noumenal selves in virtue of which they were united. For the above reasons, 
it will not due to appeal to the mere fact that the phenomenal and noumenal selves have some 
causal, inherence, or grounding relation, so the reply would need to pick out a more specific 
relation that holds only between particular phenomenal and noumenal selves.  
Since rational selves are very distinctive entities in Kant’s philosophy, there are many 
specific relations that could potentially be appealed to. To my mind, the most promising 
approach would be to appeal to self-affection, which seems to be (within Kant’s theoretical 
philosophy) the distinguishing feature of selves that most directly concerns the 
phenomenal/noumenal distinction.
43
 Put in the terms of one version of the two-world reading, 
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 One might be drawn to this line if one thought, perhaps in a Hegelian spirit, that Kant’s theory assumed but 
failed to explain the unity of the self (cf. Düsing, Klaus: “Constitution and Structure of Self-Identity: Kant's 
Theory of Apperception and Hegel's Criticism,” Midwest Studies in Philosophy 8, 1983, 409-31). 
43
 See, for instance, §24 of the B Deduction. This approach was suggested to me by Béatrice Longuenesse. 
Other possibility would be to appeal to the unity of apperception (Jauernig, How to Think about Things in 
Themselves considers this). I find it harder to see how that approach would work, though, and since Kant’s 
introduces the unity of apperception in the KrV long after he introduces self-affection and his idealism, it is even 
less likely that the unity of apperception is supposed to play unique a role in unifying the phenomenal and 
noumenal selves. Finally, a two-world reader might think to appeal to the transcendental I (cf. KrV B157-159) 
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here is a principle would have the relevant implication: a particular phenomenon P is united 
to a particular noumenon N if and only if (a) P exists in virtue of intuitions that arise from 
N’s affection and (b) those intuitions inhere in N. Because this principle does not explicitly 
appeal to selves, it is not obviously ad hoc. Conditions (a) and (b) hold only for particular 
phenomenal selves and noumenal selves, since with other empirical intuitions, the noumenon 
responsible for the intuitions is presumably distinct from the noumenon in which the intuition 
inheres. For that reason, the principle implies that the self will be the only case where a 
phenomenon is united to a noumenon.   
 Even this form of the reply, however, would implicitly appeal to a brute fact: that (a) 
and (b) are necessary and sufficient for unification. (a) and (b) describe an intimate 
metaphysical relation, but one that sounds like less than sameness. As an analogy: a tattoo 
artist gives herself a tattoo of an animal. The tattoo was produced by her and inheres in her, 
but there is no intuitive temptation to say that the tattoo is the same thing as her (unless we 
think inherence is generally sufficient for sameness). This shows that the above principle 
relies on a counter-intuitive brute fact. I suspect that the same will be true of any attempt to 
unite the phenomenal and noumenal selves on the basis of some specific relation: there will 
be some implicit but counter-intuitive brute insistence that that relation is necessary and 
sufficient for sameness. Without such an insistence, though, this reply has nothing to say to 
the philosophical motivation behind the third premise of the One Self/One World Argument 
(the metaphysical uniformity of the general distinction with respect to sameness). 
Moreover, the above-mentioned textual problems this line faces are at least as serious. 
Not only does Kant frequently write as though the phenomenal/noumenal distinction were 
uniform, but he seems to assume a unified self before he introduces any distinctive features of 
the self that might explain that unity. 
 
Reply 2: Not enough noumena 
 A second potential response to the One-Self/One-World Argument might be based on 
Paul Guyer’s suggestion that the only noumena Kant postulates are God and the soul.44 If the 
soul and God were the only entities with noumenal aspects or components, then (setting God 
                                                                                                                                                                     
to unify the self, but if so, she would need to explain both why that would not unite all rational selves into one 
and why the transcendental object (cf. KrV A109) does not unify other phenomena and noumena. 
44
 Guyer, Paul: Kant and the Claims of Knowledge. New York. 1987, 334-5. Context suggests Guyer must have 
in mind the specifically noumenal soul. Guyer now explicitly endorses a two world view (Guyer, Paul: Kant. 
New York. 2006, 69-70). 
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aside) one could say that while the empirical self is united with the noumenal soul, there are 
no corresponding noumenal entities with which other empirical entities could be united. Such 
a claim would then seem to allow one to appeal to general relations in unifying the self (e.g. 
substance/accident) without having to worry about a general one-world interpretation 
resulting. 
 The principal difficulty this reply faces is textual. Kant explicitly claims that there are 
things-in-themselves for all appearances (e.g. KrV Bxxvi, A252, B306).
45
 Even if the 
relevant passages can be dealt with, Kant would need to be read as positively denying that 
there are any things-in-themselves, as opposed to remaining agnostic. Otherwise, the 
resulting view would be a sort of agnostic one-world view. 
 There would be additional difficulties for this reply in avoiding the unification of all 
phenomena with either the soul or with God. For phenomena generally may stand in many of 
the same relations to God and the soul as the phenomenal self stands to the noumenal self, but 
having all phenomena as closely united to the noumenal self as the phenomenal self is, or 
having them all form one thing with God (a la Spinoza) would surely be an un-Kantian result. 
 
Conclusion 
 
 The One-Self/One World Argument supports a general interpretive principle: since 
the self is an instance of a uniform appearance/thing-in-itself distinction, the relationship 
between the phenomenal and noumenal selves should be like that of phenomena and 
noumena generally unless there is a principled reason to think otherwise. While I have 
applied this principle to the two-world interpretation, I think the principle also yields 
constraints on how a one-world interpreter should understand ‘same thing’ relation. In 
particular, I think the noumenal and phenomenal selves cannot be identified, since they can 
have distinct determinate causal features,
46
 and the above principle therefore suggests that no 
phenomena are identical to noumena. A one-world interpreter must therefore, I hold, spell out 
the ‘same thing’ relation as something other than identity. 
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 For a useful discussion, see Allais, Lucy: “Transcendental Idealism and Metaphysics: Kant's Commitment to 
Things in Themselves”. In Kant Yearbook: Metaphysics. 2010, 1-32. 
46
 Cf. KrV A532/B560ff. This is a point sometimes made by two-world interpreters (e.g. Guyer, Kant, 68), 
though typically without realizing that the general principle applies to the self. This issue is perhaps part of why 
Allison avoids putting his interpretation in terms of identity (cf. Allison, Henry: Idealism and Freedom. 
Cambridge. 1996, 11-12). 
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How should two-world interpreters respond to the One-Self/One-World Argument? I 
believe that the best response is neither to challenge the validity of the argument, nor to 
simply charge Kant with inconsistency. Instead, two-world interpreters should reject the first 
premise. To do so, she must find some other way of reading the passages where Kant seems 
to suggest there is one self with noumenal and phenomenal sides, and find ways of making 
sense of those aspects of Kant's system that make appeal to the single self. This is no small 
task, since there are many such passages, and the unified self plays a key role throughout 
Kant’s philosophy.47 
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 Thanks to Ralf Bader,  Andrew Chignell, Dana Goswick, Stefanie Grüne, Anja Jauernig, Béatrice 
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